

King Taejong as a Statesman: *From Power to Authority*

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the career of the third king of the Joseon dynasty, Taejong, as a successful statesman. Studies of Taejong have mostly been conducted by academic historians, with a focus on political history and institutional history. As a result, two different images of Taejong have been produced: one that describes him as the “embodiment of power” and the other as a “Confucian king.” I propose that these two contrasting images of Taejong reflect his distinctiveness as compared to other kings, and that neither image can exclude or absorb the other. Hence, in order to explain this ambivalence in the two characterizations of the same person, I refocus the concept of “embodiment of power” as “politics of tact” and the concept of “Confucian king” as “gongnon politics” by examining Taejong from a statesman’s point of view and attempting a structural analysis and historical periodization. Through this analysis, I attempt to reveal the dynamics of a successful leader, from the long process of Taejong’s usurpation of power to his creation of authority.

Keywords: Taejong, Hanfeizi, politics of tact, *gongnon* politics, authority

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Preface

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the career of the third king of the Joseon dynasty, Taejong, as a successful statesman. Taejong did not leave any writings from his own hand. However, there is a vivid description of Taejong as a statesman in the *Joseon wangjo sillok* (Annals of the Joseon Dynasty) (hereafter referred to as the *Annals*). There, we find the statesman Taejong, who overcame various political confrontations during the founding of the dynasty, when power and ideas were entangled.

Studies of Taejong have mostly been conducted by academic historians, who have mainly focused on political and institutional history. As a result, two images of Taejong have been proposed: one as the “embodiment of power” and the other as a “Confucian king.” Starting with the beating to death of Jeong Mong-ju during the late Goryeo, Taejong killed the architect of the Joseon dynasty, Jeong Do-jeon, the Crown Prince Bang-seok and his brother Bang-beon, and overthrew Yi Seong-gye after the foundation of the dynasty. Just before ascending the throne, he struggled for supremacy with his brother Bang-gan. During his reign, and even after abdication, he continued to show the “embodiment of power” side of himself in his confrontation with his powerful maternal relatives and meritorious subjects.

Contrary to the image of the “embodiment of power,” Taejong, a “Confucian king,” accomplished the political institutionalization of a Confucian state through *eon-gwan* (remonstration), *gyeongyeon* (royal lectures), and *jikso* (direct appeal). He also promoted the strengthening of the kingship by entrusting the overall conduct of government business to six ministers and by establishing consultation and advisory bodies like Seungjeongwon (Royal Secretariat) and Yemungwan (Office of Royal Decrees). By institutionalizing Confucian ideology, he was able to overcome the confusion of the early stage of dynastic foundation and lay the groundwork for the structural basis of the Joseon dynasty.

Therefore, historian’s assessment of Taejong also varies. The def-

inition of him as the “embodiment of power” froze his image as one who struggled with his own kin to usurp and maintain power. His contributions to establishing regality and reorganizing the civilization system were not enough to counter this one-sided portrayal. Consequently, he is seen as a villain with his single redeeming feature being his support for the later advent of Sejong. Any further analysis stops at this negative assessment. On the other hand, the latter point of view subsumes the side of power politics within the frame of the “Confucian king.” As the institutional strengthening of the kingship comes into focus, power politics can be seen as a way of governing the nation or as a secondary side effect of strengthening the kingship. Thus, his rule is interpreted positively as having contributed to the advent of an era of prosperity under King Sejong.¹

Nonetheless, both arguments have their weaknesses. The theory that focuses on power politics neglects the true character of Taejong’s achievements,² while the theory that emphasizes those achievements dilutes the unique character of Taejong’s power politics. In other words, according to the former theory, moral judgment takes priority and any achievements based on political power cannot be positively assessed. In the latter theory, if Taejong’s power politics are merely resolved according to degrees of difference and their idiosyncrasies are blurred with that of other Confucian kings, the essential qualities of the power politics³ that only Taejong possessed could be missed.⁴

I believe that these two contrasting images of Taejong reveal how he differed from other kings, and that it is impossible for one image to either completely exclude or absorb the other. Hence, in order to explain this ambivalence in the two characterizations of the

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1. If works, such as Kim S. (1962), Chung (1977), Lee H. (1988), Choi Sung-Hi (1990, 1991), Han (1999) and Ryu (2000), focus on Taejong’s power politics, then Choi Sung-Hi (1976), Chung (1989), Lee D. (1991), Choi Seon-Hye (1995) and Han (1980, 1982, 2001) emphasize his achievements.
 2. Explained in the 4th section of “*Gongnon* Politics.”
 3. Explained in the 3rd part of “Politics of Tact.”
 4. For further details on “*gongnon* politics,” see Park and Bang (2006), and for “politics of tact,” see Park and Yi (2006).

same person, I propose a new viewpoint. In this paper, by analyzing Taejong as a statesman, I use structural analysis to unveil the distinctive nature of Taejong’s rule. That is, I analyze the dual structure formed after the Muin coup using the term “coup structure.” For this purpose, I divide the era of Taejong’s reign into two periods and define the declaration of *yusinjihwa* (the edification of restoration) in 1410 as the turning point. If the first half of his reign was characterized by a dual structure of governance (the coexistence of Confucianism and legalism), then the latter half was an era of unitary Confucian politics, namely *gongnon* politics. The foundation of *gongnon* politics was the strengthened sovereignty and political system that was formed in the earlier stage.

A statesman is one who uses power and ideas to accomplish public works. If politics can be defined as a process of realizing ideas through the medium of power, transcending time and polity, then a statesman is one who acknowledges the utility and limitations of power, carries forth historical consciousness and ideas, and contributes to the political community by performing his/her assigned task amidst realistic conditions. When analyzing a statesman thus defined, a political thought approach is required, as ideas act as independent variables. The purpose of this paper is to strip off the layers of Taejong as the “embodiment of power” and a “Confucian king” to capture the dynamic of power and ideas wielded by Taejong through a political thought approach. In other words, this paper aims to revive the image of Taejong as a successful statesman from his usurpation of power to his establishment of authority.⁵

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5. To clarify, I do not aim to justify Yi Bang-won’s coup d’état in 1398. In this paper, I attempt to present a new way of approaching the study of Taejong by analytically separating the connection between Yi Bang-won’s coup d’état and Taejong’s creation of authority.

The Coup Structure

The struggle for power that had been growing in intensity since the march back from Wihwa-do island in 1388 culminated in the enthronement of Yi Seong-gye as the king of the new dynasty. After the revolution, the emerging power attempted to establish a new order based on the new lord and minister structure, with Yi Seong-gye at the peak of power. The ideological icon of this new dynasty, Jeong Do-jeon, proposed a "Confucian national identity" for the Joseon dynasty, thereby promoting the new structure of the Joseon dynasty himself. However, his role was ended by the Muin coup in 1398 (the First Coup of Princes).

Taejong himself argued that this coup was a legitimate act of self-defense in response to an emergency situation.⁶ But could Yi Bang-won's coup truly have been such a sudden act? I believe that Yi Bang-won was consistently aware of the incidents that occurred since the nomination of the crown prince (1392) and the lead-up to the coup, and I conclude that this made it possible for him to initiate the coup. Then, what was Yi Bang-won's point of view? This can be found in the theory of justification that was formulated after the coup. Yi Bang-won concluded that the nomination of the crown prince was a mistake, and he justified the coup as follows.

Yi Bang-won believed either the eldest son or whoever had achieved the most meritorious deeds should be eligible for nomination as crown prince (*Taejo sillok* [Annals of King Taejo], 1/8/20). According to this criterion, Taejong should have been the crown prince, as he achieved the most meritorious deed in the process of founding Joseon. However, Yi Seong-gye was blind in his affection for his concubine and arranged for their son Bang-seok to become crown prince. The chief ministers were not able to enforce fair criteria to prevent this from happening. As a result, such chief ministers

6. *Taejong sillok* (Annals of King Taejong), 20th day of the 11th lunar month, 1st year of King Taejong's reign. Hereafter, it is cited as *Taejong sillok*, 1/11/20.

as Jeong Do-jeon, Nam Eun, and Sim Hyo-saeng attempted to wield power by forming a faction in support of the young crown prince. Ultimately, during Taejo's illness, the court was endangered by the coup's attempt to eliminate the other princes and royal kinsfolk and proclaim the crown prince as king. However, due to advance warning, Taejong was able to attack first and stabilize the court (*Taejo sillok*, 7/8/26).

Yi Bang-won's theory of court stabilization recorded in the *Annals* is written in a Confucian style. But this is only a superficial detail. His underlying viewpoint should be reinterpreted through a comparison with Jeong Do-jeon, who held an explicitly Confucian point of view.

First is the criterion used in nominating the crown prince. Jeong Do-jeon said that the crown prince should be an eldest son or a sage (*Joseon gyeonggukjeon* [Administrative Code of Joseon], vol. 1, the Selection of the Crown Prince). Therefore, he had no intention of proclaiming one according to utility, even though a dispute could arise by not choosing the eldest son. In contrast to Yi Bang-won, who emphasized meritorious deeds and regarded appropriate rewards and punishments as justice, Jeong Do-jeon saw respecting the virtue of the wise as *gong* (public, publicity).

Next, from Yi Bang-won's point of view, Jeong Do-jeon, Nam Eun, and Sim Hyo-saeng were attempting to wield power by forming a faction to support the young crown prince; that is, the lord-minister relationship was treated as confrontational one. In other words, Yi Bang-won understood the lord and minister relationship as one of confrontation between the ruler Yi Seong-gye and the ruled retainer who pursued private profit. On the other hand, the reason Jeong Do-jeon, who held a Confucian view of the lord-minister relationship, did not declare his intentions is because if Bang-seok became the crown prince, then Yi Bang-won would naturally have been excluded from the center of the new dynasty. Jeong Do-jeon intended to follow the model of Yi Yin or the Duke of Zhou by assisting the young lord and realizing the ideal of *sandai* (Three Dynasties).

Lastly, the insistence of the powerful faction, in trying to elimi-

nate the other princes and royal kinsfolk and rise in revolt, must have been fabricated. But this paper focuses on Yi Bang-won's subjective recognition of the situation, not on the objective facts. Put differently, Yi Bang-won's viewpoint is noteworthy in that it assesses the situation as one of "confrontation" and "treachery," although Yi Bang-won himself was conscious of the fabrication. Then, how can we interpret this viewpoint that emphasizes meritorious deeds and the assigning of sufficient reward and punishment, sees the lord and minister relationship as one of confrontation, and even assumes treason?

Hanfeizi explains the lord and minister relationship as follows:

The ruler employs a minister with a calculating mind, and the calculating minister serves the ruler. As both ruler and minister are equally calculating, each for himself, the minister avoids injuring himself and benefiting the state, while the ruler avoids injuring the state and benefiting the minister. By nature, the minister would regard injuries to himself as unprofitable, and by nature, the ruler would see injuries to the state as ruthless. In short, ruler and minister work together, each with a calculating mind (XIX. "Shixie" [On Pretension and Heresies]).

Because of the two opposing interests that would cause "superior and inferior to wage one hundred battles a day," a wise king should use rewards and punishments to control his ministers. If not, the ministers would form a faction and take over the throne, eventually committing regicide.

The inferior conceals his tricks that he uses to test the superior; the superior manipulates rules and measures in dividing the influences of the inferior. Therefore, the institution of rules and measures is the sovereign's treasure. The possession of partisans and adherents is the minister's treasure. Given this situation, if the minister does not assassinate the ruler, it is because he does not yet have a sufficient number of partisans and adherents (VIII. "Yangquan" [Wielding the Sceptre]).

As mentioned above, the lord-minister relationship described in *Hanfeizi* is not the kind of Confucian relationship that is bound by faith (*uihap*). It is rather a relationship in which each calculates and pursues his own profit. Hence the ministers would form a faction to pursue private profit amidst the confrontation (*gyehap*), and, when the time came, they would even go as far as to commit regicide. This can be considered a Hanfeizi-an perspective. It is my assumption that from the time of the nomination of the crown prince to the coup, Yi Bang-won thought and acted according to this perspective.⁷

In fact, regarding the Muin coup, it would be closer to the truth to say that Yi Bang-won harbored discontent towards Yi Seong-gye, abhorrence towards Jeong Do-jeon, and envy towards the crown prince, because he could not accept the nomination himself. But he could not repress his desire for the throne, and by using the *sabyeong* (privately trained militia) that was quickly to be abolished, he succeeded in a coup d'état. Therefore, the theory of justification that is based on the Hanfeizi-an perspective is far from the truth. On the contrary, this could be seen as transferring his point of view onto his political opponents. In the end, the coup was the work of Yi Bang-won, who formed his faction and destroyed the link among Yi Seong-gye, the crown prince, and the ministers (the *uihap* system that had been established since the foundation of the dynasty) for his own private interest. The coup could be termed a Hanfeizi-an action, in that it followed the Hanfeizi-an perspective. However, this Hanfeizi-an coup generated a Hanfeizi situation.

Taejong's coup was an aberration of Confucian national identity,

7. Here, the question of whether Taejong truly read *Hanfeizi* or not may arise. Of course, there is no description in the *Annals* of him reading *Hanfeizi*. In order to answer this question, the possibility can only be assumed indirectly by tracing back to when *Hanfeizi* was first brought to the Korean peninsula, what kind of distribution channels it went through, and how widely it was read. However, at this point there are few empirical studies on the subject, nor is this the aim of this paper. Hence, this paper continues on the assumption that Taejong could have had an opportunity to read *Hanfeizi* through an analysis of his words and actions recorded in the *Taejong sillok*.

but as previously described, Taejong avoided admitting it as such by using the theory of justification. On the contrary, he regarded himself as a faithful follower of Confucian national identity. He saw himself as the most appropriate person to exercise Confucian principles, and regarded those whom he punished as the ones who were against it. Although he was aware of his deviation from Confucian ideology, he could not allow himself to admit it. Instead, he tried to justify his usurpation of power by restoring the national identity that he himself had broken down. He tried his best to restore his relationship with Taejo as father and son. And by forming an alliance with meritorious subjects, reinstating Jeong Mong-ju and Kil Jae, and supplementing new officials, he attempted to recover the *uihap* system. Moreover, he strove for political and social institutionalization based on Confucian program and pursued the realization of a benevolent government (*injeong*) by introducing policies for the people. Externally, Taejong was a Confucian king. He was certainly Confucian, and by no means inferior to any other king of Joseon. Nevertheless, the damaged Confucian identity could not be easily recovered.

Taejong's coup realized the goal of *gyehap* (a relationship in which each pursues and calculates his own profit). Yi Bang-won clearly showed that power was monopolized by those who were strong enough to obtain it and used to dominate others. As a result, a situation in which *Hanfeizi* was significant occurred in the father-son or lord-minister relationship. In fact, not long after, the Second Coup of Princes was led by Bang-gan and the rebellion of Jo Sa-ui occurred in 1402.⁸ Accordingly, Taejong was forced into a dual role: on one hand, he had to maintain and recover Confucian national identity, and on the other, he had to manage and overcome the *Hanfeizi* situation in which he found himself. In this paper, the dual structure that was built not through a denial of national identity but as a result of a coup, which aimed only to change the subject of power, is termed "the coup structure." Now, Taejong was placed in a situation in

8. It is said that Jo Sa-ui, as a relative of King Taejo's concubine Kang, attempted to raise an army in her revenge.

which he had to confront those who would challenge his power. The cruel and merciless purging that occurred throughout the reign of Taejong is only one aspect of the power politics that originated from this dual structure.

Politics of Tact

Tact is required in a *gyehap* relationship. *Hanfeizi*, who emphasizes the initiative and secrecy of the lord, gives seven examples of the aspects of tact that a lord should employ.

Of the seven forms of tact, the first is said to be "comparing and inspecting all available theories"; the second, "making punishment definite and authority clear"; the third, "bestowing rewards faithfully and everybody exerting his ability"; the fourth, "listening to all sides of every story and holding every speaker responsible"; the fifth, "issuing spurious edicts and making pretentious appointments"; the sixth, "inquiring into cases by manipulating different information"; and the seventh, "inverting words and reversing tasks" (XXX. "Qishu" [Seven Forms of Tact]).

While the first four are correct forms of tact representing a straightforward approach, the last three are incorrect forms of tact representing oblique and mischievous methods. However, *Hanfeizi* does not distinguish between good and bad methods. For him, the priority was on controlling ministers, and the means used to achieve this did not matter greatly. Therefore, one should "pretend to have not seen anything even if something was already seen, and pretend to have not heard anything even if something was already heard" (V. "Zhudao" [The Tao of the Sovereign]), "give ministers false encouragements and thereby extirpate their attempts to infringe on the ruler's rights, invert your words and thereby ferret out suspects, use contradictory arguments and thereby discover the invisible culprits" (XLVIII. "Bajing" [Eight Canons]). One should not hesitate to ensnare subjects in discreetly prepared traps and ruthlessly punish those who are

caught. Especially, “favorite subjects, if too intimate with the ruler, would cause him personal danger; ministers, if too powerful, would overturn the august position of the sovereign” (IV. “Aichen” [On Favourite Vassals]). Hence, a lord should nip the situation in the bud before his subjects becomes a “tiger” (V. “The Tao of the Sovereign”) and harms the lord. Hanfeizi emphasizes the need for “pruning the branches,” arguing that the power of the lord can be raised by strengthening the root and weakening the branches and leaves.

The ruler of men should often encourage the trunk to grow but never allow the branches to flourish. Luxuriant branches would cover the gates of public buildings, until private houses became full, public halls empty, and the sovereign deluded. So, grow the trunk often but never allow any branch to grow outward. Any branch that grows outward will upset the position of the sovereign (VIII. “Wielding the Sceptre”).

The first persons Taejong targeted for “pruning” were Yi Geo-i and his son, Yi Jeo. Given that a figure like Jo Sa-ui could appear at any moment as long as the coup structure was allowed to continue, Taejong selected Yi Geo-i and his son to make an example of them. However, this was stopped before Taejong’s original intent was reached due to interference by Yi Seong-gye, the abdicated king, who pointed out the need to maintain honorable treatment of royal kinsfolk. Taejong’s politics of tact were fully deployed in the abdication incident (August 1406) that happened two years later, and in another case that was triggered by the former, namely, the purge of the Min Mu-gu and Min Mu-jil brothers (which ended with their suicide in March 1410).

On August 18, 1406, Taejong, aged 40, suddenly showed his intent to abdicate in favor of the crown prince who had ascended merely two years previously and was only thirteen years old at the time. The crown prince was too young and Taejong was still too young to step down. The ministers were not certain of his intentions and so the Min brothers, brothers-in-law of Taejong, fell into a fatal trap.

This series of incidents that took place within nine days, from 18 to 26 August, were calculated by Taejong for a political purpose. After the incident involving Yi Geo-i and his son was settled on October 20, 1404, Taejong formed a blood alliance on November 16 with meritorious subjects in order to strengthen the disheveled faith in the lord and minister relationship and to tighten discipline. Hence, Taejong wanted to confirm the loyalty of his ministers as time went by, and, furthermore, he took it as a chance to ferret out and punish potential threats by actively implementing politics of tact. As a result, the Min brothers were caught.

Deciding to settle the matter of the Min brothers ten months after the abdication incident took place, Taejong let Yi Hwa impeach the brothers and then moved on to a full-scale cleanup. Yi Hwa’s written appeal contained two main charges against the Min brothers. The first was the hint of glee on Min Mu-gu’s face when Taejong declared his intent to abdicate and Min Mu-gu took his restoration with sorrow. The second was the statement, “it would be better for no one but the crown prince to have talent,” which exhibited his intent to commit treason by destroying the lineage of the royal family (*Taejong sillok*, 7/7/10).

On September 18, less than two months after Yi Hwa’s appeal, Taejong called upon Min Mu-hyul and Min Mu-hoe and explained that their brothers were confined to the province due to their disloyal action. Here, we can confirm the meaning of Min Mu-gu’s “facial expression” and Taejong’s political tact that drove him into a trap.

Once Min Mu-gu and Yi Suk-beon were granted an audience, I told them the reason for the declination of the throne. To this, Yi Suk-beon replied, “your highness’ suggestion also comes from the will of Heaven.” Min Mu-gu retorted, “What is this? If your highness would abdicate the throne, I would also ask to resign from military service” (*Taejong sillok*, 7/9/18).

At first, when Taejong implied his intent to abdicate, Yi Suk-beon accepted this as “the will of Heaven.” However, it seems as if these words were a trap to catch Min Mu-gu, rather than a reflection of his

true motive. The *Annals* state that Taejong, who began to strike the Min brothers through Yi Hwa's appeal, conspired with Yi Suk-beon to find the means to punish those who were involved in the plot.⁹ At the time, Taejong and Yi Suk-beon were looking for an excuse to get rid of Min Mu-gu. Considering this Taejong's true motive was not to abdicate nor was Yi Suk-beon's acceptance sincere. Both were merely a ploy to uncover Min Mu-gu's intentions using the royal audience. At first, Min Mu-gu did not fall into the trap. Nor did he celebrate his having outwitted them either, but instead expressed anger and even tried to resign. Nevertheless, a few days later, Min Mu-gu returned to inform him that the ministers of state were willing to follow the king's intentions. Taejong rejoiced at hearing this because Min Mu-gu had fallen into the snare.

One day, Min Mu-gu said to me, "All the ministers have told me that his Majesty's will has been settled, and as vassals we can not dare be persistent. So by preparing many procedures for the abdication in advance, we are to follow the orders of his Majesty." I rejoiced as I heard, but later, the ministers, leading all the government officials, started to argue at the palace courtyard once again. I told Min Mu-gu, "I have already told many *dae-eon* (officials above the third rank of Seungjeongwon) what you said the other day, so why are they reacting like this again now?" He replied, "What I heard was a secret from one of the ministers. Why did your highness spill my words to the *dae-eon*? I in turn replied, "Since you mentioned the ministers, I thought many people had discussed it." . . . After this, the throne was not abdicated. Many vassals retreated after making felicitations, but Min Mu-gu carried a hint of anger when he was in my audience, which I did not comprehend. How could I possibly have favored being a king! (*Taejong sillok*, 7/9/18)

With the entrapment of Min Mu-gu, Taejong purposely leaked his

9. There are many parts in the *Annals* that indicate Taejong used Yi Suk-beon to remove the Min brothers. *Taejong sillok*, 7/7/10, 7/7/12, 16/6/4, 16/6/21; and *Sejong sillok*, the year of enthronement/10/28.

words to the *dae-eon* and dodged Min Mu-gu's resentment by replying that he "thought many people had discussed it." Afterwards, as Taejong cancelled his abdication, Min Mu-gu discovered that it was merely a plot to trap him; he became furious.

The truth was thus revealed by Taejong himself, regarding Min Mu-gu's "facial expression." In Yi Hwa's appeal, Min Mu-gu was depicted as having celebrated Taejong's declaration of abdication, which was not true; Min Mu-gu was not pleased to hear that Taejong intended to abdicate the royal throne. Instead, it was Taejong who rejoiced after hearing the acceptance of the ministers' approval of abdication from Min Mu-gu. When declaring his plans for restoration, Min Mu-gu expressed anger. However, this was not because he opposed the restoration itself, but because he realized that Taejong was trying to entrap him.

The second charge against Min Mu-gu, indicated in Yi Hwa's written appeal, was that he traitorously intended to harm the princes. Taejong explained this matter to Min Mu-hyul and Min Mu-hoe brothers as follows:

In the past I told Min Mu-gu, "My plan is to cement the idea of leading the children to bond with one another, to share brotherly love, and to respect each other by relocating the main palace at Jangui-dong to the former site of Jo Sun and let one of my sons live there. I also plan to purchase the neighboring Jeong Hui-gye and let another live there. To this, Min Mu-gu replied, "But there must not be an instigator between those two." Min Mu-gu was worried that a coup might have been forming among my sons. Although this shows his loyalty to the crown prince, it also displays his disloyalty towards me. How could one be harsh to the father and generous to the son! (*Taejong sillok*, 7/9/18)

Here, Taejong thought that unlike his original intent to emphasize brotherly love, Min Mu-gu intended to promote disharmony and hostility between the royal sibling by mentioning an "instigator." Taejong interpreted this to mean that Min Mu-gu was harboring thoughts of excluding the other princes due to his concern that a coup could

arise when the crown prince attained power in the future. Still, it is an extreme leap to say that Min Mu-gu harbored thoughts of treason to eliminate the royal kinsfolk based solely on the fact that he spoke of it. Considering the First and Second Coups of the Princes, these concerns expressed by Min Mu-gu were only natural, general comments.

The problem lies with Taejong's suspicion of treachery. Taejong came to power through a coup. Therefore, his overreaction to Min Mu-gu was a sign of his self-consciousness of the faults he had committed in the past; it was also based on the anxiety that only a person who usurps power can feel. As he himself had staged a coup in the past, and as Prince Bang-gan had done so under the influence of Bak Po, the uncertainty that someone sometime could instigate a coup and harm the royal kinsfolk—in addition to the obsession that originated from such a Hanfeizi situation—led him to suspect Min Mu-gu's words and interpret them as treachery. Had Taejong been a ruler who gained power through normal means and had been a Confucian king who wished to practice benevolent government (*injeong*) and exercise virtuous administration (*deokchi*), he would not have had to overinterpret every minor detail of his vassals' facial expressions, emotional conditions, and every spoken word. From this point of view, Taejong's action may be termed "pruning the branches" in that it combined political need and tact, which came about during the process of excluding his maternal relatives who could have posed a threat to his ability to manage the Hanfeizi situation, rather than enforcing the law of *Chunqiu* as a Confucian king. In this process, Taejong resorted to the trick of casting a net and waiting for others to entrap themselves.

Gongnon Politics

In May 1408, Yi Seong-gye passed away. What did his father's death mean to Taejong? The abdication incident had occurred two years prior, when an ongoing tug-of-war had been played between the lord

and vassals concerning appropriate punishment for the Min brothers, who were accused of being involved in the incident. As mentioned earlier, this was when Taejong's politics of tact were embodied within the coup structure. For Taejong, the very existence of Taejo was the center of the coup structure and also the symbol of its continuation. Therefore, his death removed the objective factor of the coup structure. Still, the coup structure had to wait for the conclusion of the Min brothers' trial for its true termination.

By March 1410, the Min brothers' incident, which had lasted for four years, concluded with the brothers' forced suicide by orders from Taejong. It is no exaggeration to say that this incident revealed the true character of tact politics. The reason the treason case lasted for four years was also due to the difficulty of punishing the Min brothers. More essentially, however, it was the management of the coup structure that was seen as more important. Now, the kingship of Taejong was firm, absent of anyone who could pose a threat. By this stage, the sovereign power could easily have become entombed in structural inertia and convert to despotism. Considering how Taejong reached this place, it would not have been surprising if his power had led him on a path of despotism. However, Taejong made a decisive change at this point.

Taejo, who passed away in May 1408, was laid in state with his legitimate queen in July 1410 at Jongmyo (Royal Ancestral Shrine). The symbol of the dynasty, Jongmyo, was created and grand ceremonies were held. This took place four months after the suicide of the Min brothers. After the installation ceremony, on the stage where the king's command was to be announced to his vassals, Taejong made the following declaration:

The high achievements and profound virtue of Taejo have reached the people and even reached heaven. As his son, I am also in line to succeed his achievements, so it is on this day that the eternal magnificence of Joseon will present itself. Still more, in performing such a grand ceremony, an extraordinary favor must be properly issued. . . . Ah, as the ceremony to ennoble my deceased father has already been

performed, I shall promote *yusinjihwa* (the edification of restoration) together with the vassals and the people, for and wide (*Taejong sillok*, 10/7/26).

The concept of *yusin* first appeared in *Shijing* (Book of Odes) when King Wen received a *cheonmyeong* (mandate of Heaven) to undertake reform despite the fact that Zhou was already an old state. At this point, Taejong announced his resolution to reform the state through the declaration of *yusinjihwa*.¹⁰ With Taejo's death, the objective factor of the coup structure had vanished and the matter of the Min brothers had been concluded. The factor that had limited his power from its birth was eliminated, and the Min brothers, who appeared to be the greatest threat to his power, were also removed. While performing the ceremony to enshrine Taejo at Jongmyo, Taejong eliminated the spiritual aspects embedded in the coup and declared his new identity to the vassals and the people. Here, I shall focus on the progressive, autonomous, creative imagination of Taejong as a statesman, who tried to overcome the dual political structure that he himself had brought in and to create true authority through his political capacity. It would not be true authority if self-volitional and despotic power, the politics of tact, were held out continuously, buried under structural limitations. At this point, through the declaration of *yusin*, Taejong brushed off the Hanfeizi-an perspective that he had maintained internally and proclaimed his con-

10. In the *Annals of King Taejong*, the expression *yusin* appears six times in total, while *yusinjihwa* is mentioned twice (*Taejong sillok*, 10/7/26, 11/7/2), *yusinjichi* (the government of restoration) three times (*Taejong sillok*, 1/9/9, 7/5/22, 13/3/12) and *yusinjigyeong* (the congratulation of restoration) once (*Taejong sillok*, 18/8/10). On the occasion of the 1st, 7th, 11th, and 13th years, it appears in the written appeals of vassals (in which the one in the 11th year is related with Taejo's foundation). It is expressed in the form of *gyoseo* (a royal command) on only two occasions, the 10th and 18th. The first royal command is what this paper focuses on and the second is the royal command on the abdication to Sejong. Considering the relative importance of the abdication message of the 18th year, the significance of the meaning embodied in the expression *yusin*, used in the 10th year, can be perceived.

version as a Confucian king. I am convinced that the true value of Taejong's achievement as a Confucian king emanates from this point.

To prove this contention, I divide the era of Taejong's reign into two halves: the early half dating from the Muin Coup of 1398 to the punishment of the Min brothers, and the latter half from the declaration of *yusinjihwa* to the end of his reign. If the early half was the era of dual structure due to the coup, the latter half was the era of unitary Confucian politics, based on his self-consciousness of Confucian identity. After the declaration of *yusinjihwa*, Taejong introduced Confucian politics on a full scale, using the strengthened sovereign power and political system that was formed in the early stage. I believe that at this stage, Taejong pursued *gongnon* politics. In other words, Taejong aimed to reach another level of politics that differed from the achievements of the Confucian king presented in the preceding studies.

To this day, no studies have been conducted on the relation of between Taejong and *gongnon* politics. If one views *gongnon* politics through the existing work that sees it as a form of politics delegated to the prime minister (*jaesang wiim jeongchi*) or as a collaborative form of politics between the lord and ministers (*gunsin hyeopchi*), Taejong's leadership would be seen as rather far from *gongnon* politics. In addition, the existing apprehension that relates *gongnon* politics to Western-style deliberative democracy or constitutionalism would raise a serious issue concerning the role of the king, which is one of the subjects of *gongnon* politics. This can lead to a negative portrayal of the king, who is a significant political performer in Neo-Confucianism, or, even if the role of the king is approved, a portrayal that places greater emphasis on the role of the minister, vassals, or the people's will. In this case, the kingship is perceived as a self-willed, despotic one that opposes *gongnon* politics. This eventually relegates *gongnon* to the right of vassals, explaining it through the expansion of vassals' rights and the weakening of the kingship, as well as the augmentation of the autonomy and the role of vassals. It even extends it to a politics delegated to the prime minister, or *sarim* politics (politics via the Neo-Confucian literati). This point of view

indicates that Taejong, who strove to strengthen the kingship, either did not resort to *gongnon* politics or did not get any further than setting down the foundation of *gongnon* politics for it to be expanded in Sejong's era.¹¹

However, the concept of *gongnon* in Neo-Confucianism does not mean that the power of vassals is superior to the kingship. Furthermore, it is not precisely defined as being public opinion or the view of the majority. In contrast to the modern Western point of view, where restriction of the kingship is equated with constitutional, democratic history and the kingship is seen as willful exercise of power—just as the kingship is seen as the king's volitional exercise of power or the absolute revelation of personal will in absolute kingship—it is a self-evident truth in Neo-Confucianism that the king plays a key role in realizing the politics that pursue *cheolli* (principle of Heaven). Considering that the will and decision of the king is an important factor of *gongnon* politics in pursuing *cheolli*, it can be seen that the role of the king does not oppose *gongnon* politics in determining policy. Therefore, Taejong's policy of strengthening the kingship cannot be concluded as a negation of *gongnon* politics. The delicate nature of *gongnon* politics and the kingship can sometimes cause complications, yet they can still sometimes be pursued simultaneously. The principal point is Taejong's policy of strengthening the kingship and the eventual effect it would have over *gongnon* politics.

In the early half of his reign, Taejong accomplished political institutionalization of the Confucian state through *eon-gwan*, *gyeong-gyeon*, and *jikso* and also promoted the strengthening of the kingship by entrusting the overall conduct of government business to six ministers and establishing consultative and advisory organizations like Seungjeongwon and Yemunwan. These policies to strengthen the kingship had a stronger influence in fostering the formation and enlargement of *gongnon* and weakening the power of influential vas-

11. Definitions of and research on *gongnon* politics in the Joseon dynasty include Kim Yong-Jick (1998), Lee H. (2002), Um (2002), Kim Yeong-ju (2002), Park Hyun Mo (2004, 2005) and Lee S. (2005).

sals who had distorted and suppressed the emergence of *gongnon* since the last years of Goryeo, rather than returning to the establishment of self-volitional, autocratic kingship. Its consequence was not the enlargement of the kingship but its normalization, which was sufficient to weaken the power of influential vassals who distorted and suppressed the emergence of *gongnon* and to foster its formation and enlargement. The strengthening of the kingship policy during the early half of Taejong's reign became the basis of the practice of *gongnon* politics in the latter half of the reign.

Even in the early half of the reign, unless it was a crucial issue, Taejong generally accepted the opinion of the administrative bureaucrats. However, he reacted negatively and with nervousness when the vassals opposed any issue that he himself was promoting with vigorous volition by radically or abruptly opposing them and withdrawing his opinion. However, after the establishment of *yusin*, Taejong dealt with matters in a much more rational and refined way, overcoming his defensiveness in the early half of the reign. Following the declaration of *yusinjihwa*, Taejong indicated his stance as a king but also endeavored to demonstrate methodical leadership, such as by drafting policies through long discussions with vassals, especially regarding those issues in the early half of the reign that had been stranded after fomenting friction with said vassals. As an example, this paper looks into the enforcement of the *jeohwa* (paper money) policy.¹²

12. Specific examples of *gongnon* politics in the latter half of Taejong's reign can be divided into three main categories. First is the issue of national policies, which include the policies of *jeohwa* and of slavery. Secondly, after *yusin*, the topic of discussion reached beyond the level of practical administrative work extended to issues that required the king's decision, or issues that were not open in the early half of the reign. For example, there is the matter of returning to the capital, Hanyang, and the right of personnel management. Lastly, if *gongnon* politics is a way of realizing the politics that pursues *cheolli*, the highest level of discussions on *gongnon* is, in the end, political philosophic issues. Therefore, the practical expression of political philosophic issues are related to courtesy and cultural systems. As issues related to this matter, there are examples of funeral ceremonies and the ceremony of serving the Heaven.

The *jeohwa* policy was suggested by Ha Yun in April 1401, Taejong's first year of reign. He justified it as being for the people. From the very start, Taejong repelled strong opposition from the vassals and pushed for the circulation of *jeohwa*. However, after three years of rule, when even the opposing vassals had embraced the *jeohwa* policy, Taejong unilaterally abandoned the circulation of *jeohwa* (*Taejong sillok*, 3/9/10).

The enforcement and abandonment of the *jeohwa* policy clearly confirms that the collapse was driven by Taejong's unilateral policy decision. First, the enforcement of the *jeohwa* policy itself was a unilateral decision made between Taejong and his close aide, Ha Yun. Second, there was no detailed discussion of practical methods to enforce the policy. The major acts of enforcement were based on Taejong's unilateral orders (*Taejong sillok*, 2/1/7, 2/3/7, 2/4/19, 2/6/10) or on spontaneous decisions, depending on the vassals' appeals (*Taejong sillok*, 2/1/9, 2/2/14, 2/4/6, 2/9/24). Third, the abolition of the *jeohwa* policy was also Taejong's unilateral decision.

Nevertheless, the once-abandoned *jeohwa* policy was revived seven years later in July 1410. It was significant for two reasons. Firstly, the revival occurred almost simultaneously with Taejong's declaration of *yusinjihwa*, and secondly, the revival and enforcement of the *jeohwa* policy was, unlike the early half of the reign, accomplished through close discussions with vassals.

If it is said that the *jeohwa* policy in the early half of the reign was a hasty decision made between Taejong and his close aide, Ha Yun, the revival of the *jeohwa* policy almost simultaneously with Taejong's declaration of *yusinjihwa* was significant in the sense that it demonstrated Taejong's acceptance of the discussion among the Uijeongbu (State Council), Hojo (Ministry of Finance) and *dae-eon*. Of course, Taejong's will must have played an important role in the *jeohwa* policy revival. However, that Taejong's will emerged not through his unilateral decision or secret discussion with his aides but from an open discussion with the vassals reveals the full scale of *gongnon* politics after *yusinjihwa*. Furthermore, although it cannot be described in detail, during the long-term, practical process of enforc-

ing and modifying the revived *jeohwa* policy, it is evident that discussion was held with the vassals.

It is also evident that Joseon, during the reign of Taejong, was experiencing *gongnon* politics. In the early half of the reign, politics of tact were accompanied by ruthless political purges instituted under Taejong's initiative. At the same time, the Confucian political structure was steadily institutionalized. These two processes combined to strengthen the kingship, and the practice of *gongnon* politics in the latter half of the reign was realized through this foundation. Therefore, the *gongnon* politics of Sejong should be seen as an extension of Taejong's *gongnon* politics that were realized after the declaration of *yusinjihwa*. Sejong was able to bring cultural politics and *gongnon* politics to their maturity because he learned the structure of *gongnon* politics through his political experience gained during Taejong's reign and was politically disciplined during this process. Furthermore, Sejong's accomplishments were also due to the vassals, who had learned the importance of harmony between their rights and the kingship. Taejong not only passed down a strengthened kingship and political system to Sejong, but more importantly, handed over the exact political direction of the Joseon dynasty as a Confucian state and the foundation and experience of *gongnon* politics to accomplish it.

Change of Identity

Following his father's example, Yi Bang-won possessed the characteristics of a warrior, but he was also a recognized literary talent who had received Yi Seong-gye's encouragement and passed the higher civil service examination in the last years of Goryeo. His warrior-like nature vividly emerged during such incidents as the assassination of Jeong Mong-ju and the First and Second Coups of the Princes, which were crucial moments in the struggle for power, in which military force was involved. Once enthroned, however, the only environment where he could publicly express his warrior-like nature was during

army training and hunting. Hence, Taejong, who wanted to demonstrate his warrior-like nature from the early stages of his reign, often had to confront the opposition of the *daegan* (official censors) who tried to restrict it in accordance with the idea of a Confucian king. In the following passage, Taejong expresses his warrior-like tendencies intensely.

I am not someone who grew up in the royal palace. I became a student of Confucianism by mere chance based on a few readings of the *Shujing* (Book of Documents) and *Shijing* (Book of Odes). In actuality, I am a descendant of a military family. I have ridden horses and hunted since childhood (*Taejong sillok*, 3/10/1).¹³

It would be reasonable to regard this as his honest feelings. In addition, since Taejong also had to manage the Hanfeizi situation under the dual structure, he could not have simply followed the vassals in their Confucian restraint, armed as they were with the ideals of a Confucian king. I argue that Taejong not only deliberately expressed his warrior side in keeping with the need for military training and hunting, but also leaned towards his warrior identity in order to distinguish himself from the idealized image of a Confucian king, thereby securing his autonomy from the vassals and ensuring his free use of politics of tact. No direct connection between the warrior-like identity and politics of tact is evident, but there is an affinity between the two when it comes to securing autonomy from the vassals who pursued the ideals of a Confucian king.

However, the latter half of the *Annals*, where it is stated that the coup structure disappeared and *gongnon* politics was in operation from the unilateral Confucian king's point of view, does not mention Taejong having a military focus in opposition to the vassals. In the spring of 1413, the relationship between Taejong and the vassals, who were previously in opposition to each other regarding the issue of military training, became much more delicate.¹⁴ Also, by 1416 and

13. Also refer to *Taejong sillok*, 6/9/5, 6/9/25.

14. Refer to *Taejong sillok*, 13/3/2, 13/3/18, 13/4/4.

1417, it appears in the *Annals* that Taejong himself was changing his identity from that of a warrior to a Confucian literati.¹⁵

People tell me I like martial things because I am from a military family. But Taejo encouraged me to learn Confucianism, and I did not learn archery until I was in the prime of my manhood. Therefore, I cannot say that I like martial things nor can I say that I do not like them (*Taejong sillok*, 17/2/2).

Bak Sin appealed to the king, saying "Let the training of warriors be like that of Seonggyungwan (National Confucian Academy). Have them read books on strategy and tactics day and night." The king replied, "How could the reading of books on strategy and tactics be compared to the studying of the Four Books and the Six Classics (*Taejong sillok*, 17/leap 5/4).¹⁶

It is extremely significant that such a powerful king as Taejong practically reversed his identity, especially during his reign. If Taejong in the early half of his reign wanted to secure autonomy from the vassals by distinguishing himself from the ideal image of a Confucian king and defining himself as a military leader under the dual structure, Taejong in the latter half of his reign wanted to fulfill *gongnon* politics with the vassals by transforming and positioning himself completely as a Confucian king.

After the declaration of *yusinjihwa*, the advent of *gongnon* politics and his change in identity are confirmed in the *Annals*. The reciprocity between these two enhanced both Taejong's spiritual mind and the political world of Joseon. Taejong was no longer like Yi Bang-won who, before coming to power, plunged into the pursuit of

15. But this does not mean that there was a change in identity at this stage. I estimate that Taejong's change in identity had started by the time of the declaration of *yusinjihwa*. Further explanation will be provided on why the change of identity is mentioned at this stage.

16. On the same day, it is recorded that Taejong said, "Military arts in and of themselves are works of madness and do not require much effort, so people are fond of them." Also refer to *Taejong sillok*, 16/1/20, 17/10/8.

power without any regard for the means. Moreover, he was not the Taejong of the early half of his reign, who promoted politics of tact to manage the Hanfeizi situation in a dual structure.

As mentioned earlier, Taejong passed the higher civil service examination when he was 17 years old. He was a scholar of Confucianism, who read the histories and the classical canon. *Saseo jipju* (Collected Commentaries on the Four Books by Zhu Xi) was held in high esteem as the source of exam subjects in those days; therefore, he must have held a competent level of insight on Neo-Confucianism. After his accession to the throne, he read *Daxue yanyi* (Commentary of Great Learning) and *Zhongyong* (The Doctrine of the Mean), which deepened his understanding of Neo-Confucianism. In 1410, he proclaimed that he wanted to “spread *yusinjihwa* at large together with the vassals and the people.” After this pronouncement he conducted *gongnon* politics with the vassals. I believe that during this process Taejong opened his eyes to the world of ideas. Taejong asked, “How could the readings of books on strategy and tactics be compared to studying the Four Books and the Six Classics.” This reflected the fact that Taejong’s desire to become a sage king, that is, to realize the ideal world suggested by the classical canons, such as Yao-Shun *sandai*, can be assumed. It cannot be hastily concluded whether or not he himself tried to become a sage king, but he at least must have expected his successor to become one. It seems that Taejong’s change of identity is closely related to the dethronement of the crown prince.

In November 1410, the Crown Prince Yangnyeong was scolded by Taejong for his misconduct, including secretly raising a hawk and inviting a *gisaeng* (female entertainer) into the palace. The crown prince was then driven into a corner, arousing the anger of Taejong due to an incident involving the *gisaeng* Chogungjang in May 1415. Nevertheless, it was not until Eori, the concubine of Kwak Seon, was brought into the palace on February 15, 1417 that the issue was raised to the level of a political one. After this the relationship between Taejong and the crown prince worsened with the resulting dethronement confirmed on June 3, 1418.

The Eori incident confirmed Taejong’s decision to dethrone the

crown prince, and it is noteworthy that he shifted his personal focus from that of a warrior to that of a literati around this time. I surmise that the basic reason for Taejong’s decision to dethrone the crown prince, even going as far as to accept the inherent dangers of doing so, can be found in Taejong’s desire to realize an ideal world, which was formed in the process of his own change of identity. That is, the reason can be found in Taejong’s ideas.

By the end of his reign, Taejong was mapping out a post-Taejong scheme. He viewed his successor as embodying a cross between philosophical recognition of the classical canon and historical understanding of the Joseon dynasty. Had he been the Taejong of the past, he might have settled on Yangnyeong as his successor, despite the problems he had. However, Taejong had already transcended his previous identity, whereas Yangnyeong continued to think of himself and the Joseon dynasty based on Taejong’s previous style. He was confident in his abilities as a king, assuming that he would follow Taejong’s early style. Naturally, he would have felt betrayed by the transformed Taejong. This difference caused extreme confrontation and discord between Taejong and Yangnyeong.

On the contrary, Chungnyeong autonomously formed his own world outside of this composition of Taejong and Yangnyeong. If Yangnyeong followed Taejong’s politics and identified with him, Chungnyeong followed his own path separate from Taejong. Hence, once Taejong underwent a change of identity, he turned away from the crown prince, who resembled his earlier self, and focused on Chungnyeong. The dethronement was the natural consequence of this transformation.

Taejong, who dethroned Yangnyeong, abdicated the throne to Sejong without delay on August 10, 1418.¹⁷ During a banquet held a few days after Sejong’s coronation, Taejong told the other vassals of his expectations for Sejong as a sage king: “Even though the throne

17. As mentioned earlier, in the royal command of abdication, the expression *yusinji-gyeong* (congratulation on restoration) is used.

has been succeeded, there would still be anxiety if we had not found the right person. My successor is truly a king who will follow a scholarly path and bring about a peaceful era" (*Sejong sillok*, the year of enthronement/8/18).

Closing Remarks

Taejong's expectations for Sejong as a sage king did not go unmet. Taejong told the vassals, "The king is the equal of King Wen." Satisfied with having found such a successor, he expressed the following to a vassal, "Since I entrusted the state to such a fine ruler, I am the only person in the world who has no worries and can idly stroll between the mountains and the waters" (*Sejong sillok*, 2/5/16).

After abdicating, Taejong often used the phrase "I have been heightened"¹⁸ on occasions where the lord and ministers were seated together.¹⁹ Taejong expressed his glorious "authority" through the phrase, which he coined as a result of raising a son and successor who resembled King Wen. He was also cheered by others' recognition, saying, "What can I say when all of the vassals love me like this. . . . I am truly a fortunate person" (*Sejong sillok*, 3/1/1). Sejong and the vassals responded to the authority that Taejong created by creating the title of honor, *Seongdeok singong taesangwang* (Sainly Virtue, Ethereal Achievement, Abdicated King)" (*Sejong sillok*, 3/9/12).

On April 22 in the 4th year of Sejong (1422), Taejong did not feel well after returning from watching falconry exercises outside the capital with Sejong. He passed away on May 10, at the age of 56. In the *Annals*, nothing politically interesting is noted before and after his death. It only records the natural death of an "authority." He, who had endowed others' deaths with political significance, died an ordi-

18. "吾益尊."

19. *Sejong sillok*, the year of enthronement/8/18, the year of enthronement/11/8, the year of enthronement/11/16.

nary one. As his death symbolized, the raging political waves had calmed and the era of late Goryeo to early Joseon came to an end. However, Taejong himself had already planted the seed of a new era four years prior. The glory of the Joseon dynasty would be realized not only through his biological DNA embedded in the royal line but also in the cultural DNA he had instilled during his rule. In the end, Taejong was a successful statesman. Though there are many historical examples of usurpations of power, they have usually brought forth further struggles for power, leading to vicious cycles of revenge, the rewriting of history in blood, and the extracting of a severe price for these usurpations. Rarely is the usurpation of power successfully concluded with a peaceful transition. This paper has thus analyzed and described the long process of Taejong's rule and transformation, from his usurpation of power to his creation of authority.

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GLOSSARY

Bajing (Ch.)	八經	<i>sandai</i> (Ch.)	三代
<i>cheolli</i>	天理	<i>sabyeong</i>	私兵
<i>cheonmyeong</i>	天命	<i>sarim</i>	士林
Chunqiu (Ch.)	春秋	<i>Saseo jipju</i>	四書集注
<i>dae-eon</i>	代言	<i>seongdeok sin-gong</i>	聖德神功
<i>daegan</i>	臺諫	Seonggyungwan	成均館
<i>Daxue yanyi</i> (Ch.)	大學衍義	Seungeongwon	承政院
<i>deokchi</i>	德治	<i>Shijing</i> (Ch.)	詩經
<i>eon-gwan</i>	言官	Shixie (Ch.)	飾邪
<i>gisaeng</i>	妓生	<i>Shujing</i> (Ch.)	書經
<i>gong</i>	公	Shun (Ch.)	舜
<i>gongnon</i>	公論	<i>uihap</i>	義合
<i>gongsin</i>	功臣	Uijeongbu	議政府
<i>gunsin hyeopchi</i>	君臣協治	Yangquan (Ch.)	揚權
<i>gyehap</i>	計合	Yemungwan	藝文館
<i>gyeongyeon</i>	經筵	Yao (Ch.)	堯
<i>gyoseo</i>	教書	<i>yusinjichi</i>	維新之治
Hojo	戶曹	<i>yusinjigyeong</i>	維新之慶
<i>injeong</i>	仁政	<i>yusinjihwa</i>	維新之化
<i>Joseon gyeongguk jeon</i>	朝鮮經國典	Wen (Ch.)	文(王)
<i>jaesang wiim jeongchi</i>	宰相委任政治	Wihwa-do	威化島
<i>jeohwa</i>	楮貨	Yi Yin (Ch.)	伊尹
<i>jikso</i>	直訴	<i>Zhongyong</i> (Ch.)	中庸
Jongmyo	宗廟	Zhou (Ch.)	周
Muin	戊寅	Zhudao (Ch.)	主道
Qishu (Ch.)	七術		

(Ch.: Chinese)